

World War II Background


For Americans, World War II began with the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. That same day, Japanese bombs fell on American and British naval bases in the Philippines, Hong Kong, and Malaya. President Roosevelt dubbed it “a date that will live in infamy.” Indeed, the bombings awoke the United States out of its neutrality, and it declared war against Japan on December 8.

European Theater and Strategic Bombing

However, for the other belligerents, the war had been raging for years. In Europe, fascist movements set the stage in the 1920s with their frequent praise of militarism and calls for territorial expansion. Benito Mussolini, the founder of the Italian Fascist party, found himself legally appointed as prime minister in 1922. He glorified obedience, group identity, and traditional gender roles, famously claiming that “War is to men what motherhood is to women.”[1] He invaded Ethiopia in 1936 in his bid for empire. Meanwhile, Adolf Hitler, leader of the National Socialist German Workers Party (Nazis), railed against the Versailles Treaty, stirring up anger at the humiliating terms that the postwar Weimar Republic had accepted. Suffering from inflation and economic hard times, many Germans responded to Hitler’s claim that survival depended on increasing their *lebensraum* (living space). To revive German pride, Hitler promised to reunite the Aryan race and tagged Jews, Roma (formerly called Gypsies), Slavs, and many others as outsiders who did not belong. War broke out in Europe in September 1939, with Britain and France finally checking Hitler’s advance into Poland. By the spring of 1940, the German military had successfully conquered most of central and western Europe. The Germans hoped to knock Britain out the war from the air and commenced the first all-air battle in history, the Battle of Britain, nicknamed the Blitz. The original goal of attacking infrastructure and transportation hubs proved unfeasible. The technology was insufficient to engage in precision attacks. A new strategy emphasized destroying civilian targets to slow the war effort and decrease morale. Historians still debate the number of deaths; the Luftwaffe killed between 15,000 and 40,000 people by dropping bombs on London and other towns. By December 1940 the Royal Air Force had stalled Hitler’s momentum. The Germans abandoned plans for an invasion. As Prime Minister Winston Churchill said at the time, “Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.”[2]

In response to the attacks on the homefront, Britain began its own bombing campaign against Germany, supplemented by American support after Pearl Harbor. Over the course of five years, approximately 300,000 Germans died and 780,000 were wounded. In Dresden, for example, Allied planes dropped 2600 tons of explosives and incendiary bombs, destroying the city in a firestorm that killed between 25,000 and 100,000 noncombatants over four days in February 1945.

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The toll of noncombatant deaths in Europe and the Soviet Union is staggering.[3] Yet there were few debates over the ethics and efficiency of air raids that targeted civilians. Initially, the Americans agreed to conduct only daytime, precision bombing while the British engaged in area bombing, often at night. As the war dragged on the distinction blurred.


Japanese-American Relations: Background

The history of World War II in the Pacific Theater begins long before Pearl Harbor. The historian Michael Bess makes a persuasive case that we should start with Japan's initial encounter with the United States and the use of "gunboat diplomacy." Commodore Matthew Perry sailed into a fortified harbor in 1853 against Japan's wishes. Armed with four ships and a letter from the president, Perry demanded Japan open its border to trade. The next year he entered Tokyo Bay with nine ships and strong-armed the Japanese leaders to sign a treaty that favored American interests. Perry had ended 250 years of self-imposed isolation and thrust Japan into the era of Imperialism. Over the next few decades, a series Unequal Treaties followed, opening Japan to trade with western nations. The experience of "forced submission," as Bess explains, "exerted a decisive impact on Japanese mentalities, and thus played a pivotal role in the formation of modern Japanese national feeling." [4] Japanese national identity developed in response to imperialist aggression.

The Japanese government was aware of the fates of many of their neighbors who had lost their independence to western nations, and it was eager to avoid such a fate. The leaders embarked on a top-down crusade to hasten industrialization and remake their government and society. They turned away from their isolationist stance to emulate European and American advances. Rather than be a victim of conquest, Japan became one of the conquerors. As one of the men who fashioned the Japanese constitution in the late nineteenth century noted, "The aim of our country has been from the very beginning, to attain among the nations of the world the status of a civilized nation and to become a member of the community of European and American nations which occupy the position of civilized countries." [5] Japan won wars against China (1895) and Russia (1905) and annexed Korea as a colony (1910). Japan joined the Allies in World War I and won some of Germany's Asian holdings in the peace settlement. By the 1920s, as fascism became a popular political philosophy in Europe, most Japanese also supported the idea of creating a strong empire that would enrich the homeland by providing vital resources. Some preferred to proceed slowly; others, notably many military leaders, pushed for rapid expansion.

By the 1930s, as Hitler was embarking on his plans to annex Germany's neighbors, Japanese hard-liners took control of national policy, using "assassination and other forms of illegal intimidation to silence their opponents." [6] No formal movement tried to stop them. Japan invaded Manchuria, a Chinese province mired in semi-anarchy, in 1931 under the guise of restoring order. They renamed the area Manchuko and installed a puppet ruler, the former child emperor of China. The League of Nations reprimanded Japan but lacked the authority to impose

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
any penalty. Even within Japan, opposition voices were silenced. In February 1936 rabidly nationalist army officers assassinated a group of moderates who had spoken out against rapid expansion. Even though the leaders were punished, the message was clear: the leaders were intent on creating a strong empire and would not tolerate criticism.

In 1937, Japanese troops skirmished with Chinese military and initiated air raids in Beijing, Tientsin, and Shanghai that targeted civilians. The Chinese army retreated, leaving Nanking undefended. Borrowing a page from the military strategy of Alexander the Great, Japanese leaders stormed into the city intending to send a message to all of China that resistance was futile. Troops ferociously attacked combatants and noncombatants. The Rape of Nanking, as history remembers it, was both a metaphorical rape, an unprovoked attack against a defenseless city, and involved literal rape. Soldiers raped 20,000 women and girls of all ages; many were then raped again, mutilated, or murdered. Meanwhile, troops massacred 20,000 civilian men, using many as live targets for bayonet practice or killing them in other brutal ways, such as burning them alive or kicking them to death. In sum, about 200,000 Chinese people died in the six weeks of the invasion. Japanese leaders, such as General Hideki Tojo who helped lead the attack, were deaf to international outcries but developed a reputation for brutality and barbarism.

The US-Japanese relationship, strained since the 1850s, disintegrated. In 1922, after working together as allies in World War I, Japan, Britain, and the US had signed the Washington Naval Treaty to regulate military growth in the Pacific. Typical of the era, the US and Britain allowed themselves equal tonnage in warships but relegated Japan to 3/5. After Nanking, President Franklin Roosevelt wanted to send another strong message. He called for a voluntary boycott on weapon sales to Japan and shifted the homebase of the Pacific Fleet to Hawaii from San Diego. Once the war began in Europe, Japan formally aligned with Germany and Italy. Tojo became the minister of war and Yosuke Matsuoka, another devoted nationalist, foreign minister, appointments which ensured that fanatically nationalist views would prevail. They were determined to control the western Pacific Ocean region.

Nothing in history is inevitable. Events happen because of the choices individuals make every day. But the momentum in Japan certainly was pushing the country towards war. The leaders were hungry for more territory and believed their existence as an independent nation was on the line. They overstepped in July 1941 when they annexed Indochina (territory including present day Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) that had been controlled by France but was vulnerable now that Hitler had conquered most of France. The Americans then followed through on their warnings to the Japanese government that such an act would result in sanctions. The US, British, and Dutch imposed an embargo on trade. The lack of oil would be felt in a matter of months. To the Americans, Japanese leaders had to choose: retreat from Indochina and China or face economic ruin. The Japanese saw a third path: fight. Negotiations between the US and Japan continued, but Japan began preparing for war. Because most of Europe was currently under

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Hitler's control, the main players would be the US, Canada, and Britain. The Japanese leaders hoped to scare the US away from a protracted fight, one Japan could not hope to win because they were so outnumbered with so many fewer resources. The hope was that the Americans would shy away from a costly fight for far-away territory, much of which had been controlled by Europeans who were in no state to retake control if the Japanese left. And, at this point, Hawaii was not a state; it was a colony with a military base.

War in the Pacific: Responding to Pearl Harbor


Knowing the swift American response, the decision to bomb Pearl Harbor seems downright stupid – it enraged Americans and drew the US immediately into the war. But to Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who had gone to college in America and pushed for the surprise attack, it was a bold move that could destroy both the US navy's ability to enforce the embargo and the American people's will to fight. The other options—to backtrack the plan for imperial expansion or crumble economically—were unsatisfactory. At least, Yamamoto and others imagined, attacking the American and British bases provided a chance at victory.

It may be hard to imagine, but in 1941 the US had a tiny, inexperienced, and ill-equipped military. It took a few months to rev up for war, but once the American military fully engaged in fighting, it was winning battles. In June 1942, the American navy defeated the Japanese at Midway. The strategy of island hopping towards mainland Japan involved brutal fighting. Allied victories were costly. Japanese military culture disavowed surrender and many soldiers and their officers determined to fight to their deaths even when facing defeat. The use of Kamikaze suicide pilots against ships confounded the Americans, who had no tradition sending combatants to certain death.

Echoing the strategy used by the Allies against Germany and other occupied areas, the US military began area bombing in Japan as soon as it established bases close enough to reach the mainland. General Curtis LeMay focused wartime policy on maximizing the efficiency of attacks, flying B-29 bombers lower than they were designed to fly so they could drop their payload with bigger impact. In total, American planes bombed 67 Japanese cities. The most devastating raid occurred against Tokyo. On March 9-10, 1945, incendiary bombs lit the entire city on fire. People who did not die of burns died of asphyxiation because the fires burned so large, they used up all the oxygen in the air. Almost 100,000 people died that night, with another 41,000 wounded.

While bombing raids continued, military leaders were also making plans for a full-scale ground assault on mainland Japan that would begin, if necessary, on November 1, 1945. At a meeting with the Joint Chiefs on **June 18**, President Truman discussed the details of the plan. Gen. Marshall (Army) explained that “an operation against Kyushu was the only course to pursue.” Admiral King (Navy) agreed. The second wave of invasion would happen at Honshu. The group

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discussed projected casualties; the number 31,000 seemed to correspond with the rates in comparable battles but no one provided exact numbers. They also discussed other options to end the war. The US already was inflicting severe damage with a naval blockade and the air strikes. And there was optimism that Soviet Union would declare war against Japan, an act that they felt would further demoralize the Japanese. Adm. Leahy (chief of staff) also mentioned that the issue of demanding an “unconditional surrender” might be spurring the Japanese people to continue their fight. The president demurred, saying he did not control public opinion. In the end, Truman agreed to put in motion the plans for invasion of Kyushu.

The Manhattan Project & the Creation of Nuclear Weapons


Meanwhile, a secret program had begun back at home: the Manhattan Project. In 1939, the famous scientist Albert Einstein had sent a letter to inform President Roosevelt that research was already underway on nuclear energy, mentioning the work of Enrico Fermi and Leo Szilard. Fearing that the Germans were working to make nuclear weapons, Roosevelt authorized funding for Americans to ramp up research. Gen. Leslie Groves served as the head of the Manhattan Project and he hired Robert Oppenheimer to be the lead scientist. Work to discover how to build an atomic bomb happened in Los Alamos, New Mexico and Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Two types of bombs were being developed – one fueled by uranium, the other plutonium – with prototypes projected to be ready by August 1, 1945.

When Roosevelt died in April 1945, Truman, shockingly, knew nothing about the Manhattan Project. He was only two weeks on the job when Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War, told him about the project and the ramifications for the war’s end and postwar foreign relations. Truman agreed to let Stimson form a committee to consider the effects of the new technology in the postwar era. The “Interim Committee” was made up of well-respected men. In addition to Stimson (who served as chair) and Truman’s secretary of State, James Byrnes, it included university presidents and second-level military and government administrators. The group discussed the use of nuclear weapons. They did not discuss if the weapon should be used; they were interested in deciding which cities would be the targets, how to use bombs most advantageously, and whether to share the technology with other nations, especially the Soviet Union. Diplomatic and political concerns dominated these discussions as the participants were not military leaders.

Potsdam Conference & Declaration

In July 1945, President Truman traveled to Potsdam, Germany to meet with Josef Stalin, leader of the USSR, and Winston Churchill, prime minister of Great Britain. Truman had postponed the meeting so it would begin one day after the test of the atomic bomb. The Trinity test went well. Scientists and military personnel on site expressed, in the words of historian Samuel J. Walker, “a mixture of awe, elation, and relief, which in some cases was promptly followed by a sense of profound concern about what would be done with the new force they had witnessed.”[7] Truman

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was elated. He had never met Stalin before but felt an increased confidence, writing that even though Stalin have dropped some “dynamite” about his foreign policy opinions, “I have some dynamite too which I’m not exploding right now.” Truman was also pleased that Stalin had finally agreed to join the war, beginning on August 15: “Fini Japs when that comes about.”[8] Truman’s diary notes reveal that, between the atomic bomb and the entrance of the Soviets, he believed the end of the war was near.

Truman’s own words reflect mixed feelings about nuclear weapons. The US held tremendous power as the only country with such technology. But the implications were difficult to predict, as Truman acknowledged in his diary, “We have discovered the most terrible bomb in the history of the world. It may be the fire destruction prophesied in the Euphrates Valley Era, after Noah and his fabulous Ark. ...It seems the most terrible thing discovered, but it can be made the most useful.”[9] Despite this recognition, as Walker notes, Truman did not seek additional counsel from advisors or the Interim Committee. He worked under the assumption that the bomb would be used when it was ready and was uninterested in exploring the potential advantages and disadvantages of its use.[10]


On July 26, the US, Britain, and China issued the Potsdam Declaration, calling on the Japanese people to overthrow the military leaders and demand peace. It demanded an “unconditional surrender” along with a promise that the Japanese would not “be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation.” Failure to do so, it warned, would result in “prompt and utter destruction.” Such strong but vague language did not tempt Japan’s hardline leaders. Paralyzed by divisions, the leaders did not respond to the forceful declaration, giving the Americans the impression that they were uninterested in negotiating a surrender.

Hiroshima & Nagasaki

A formal order was delivered (it is unclear on what authority) to the commander of strategic air forces in the Pacific to drop the uranium 235 bomb between August 1 and August 10 on one of four predetermined Japanese targets, depending on the weather. Truman asked Henry Stimson, his secretary of war, to use the bomb “so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children” and reflected in his diary that “the target will be a purely military one.” Such an arrangement was impossible, as Stimson well knew. Gen. Curtis LeMay had been running air raids with B-29s against 67 Japanese cities. Because the Interim Committee recommended the atomic bomb be used on a clean target to better assess the level of damage, the four cities chosen as possible targets (Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, Nagasaki) were not among the 67 places already hit by Allied bombs.

Hiroshima was a large city with about 350,000 inhabitants, and though it had some military presence, it was not a vital military target (as its status as the sixty-eighth place to be attacked reveals). Colonel Paul Tibbets commanded the mission that dropped the uranium 235 bomb nicknamed “Little Boy” on the city on August 6, 1945. He was twenty-nine years old and had

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named the plane after his mother, Enola Gay. His crew consisted of 12 men. Maj. Thomas Ferebee served as the bombardier. The crew did not know the details of their mission until after take-off. Two other B-29s flew alongside them to document the blast. Such a small fleet provoked no warning sirens from the Japanese. The bomb exploded at about 8:15am, sending shock waves 11 miles into the air. The scale of damage was immediately obvious to the airmen, one of whom described being “struck dumb at the sight.”[11] On the ground, the city was in ruins. Photographs of the devastation and the voices of survivors provide the best accounts of what happened.

Yamaoka Michiko was fifteen years old, a junior in high school working for the war effort in the telephone exchange. She was walking to work when she “heard the faint sound of planes.” She looked up and “put my right hand above my eyes...to see if I could spot them. The sun was dazzling. That was the moment.” She continues her story,

There was no sound. I felt something strong. It was terribly intense. I felt colors. It wasn't heat. You can't really say it was yellow, and it wasn't blue. At that moment I thought I would be the only one who would die. I said to myself, “Goodbye, Mom.”


They say temperatures of seven thousand degrees centigrade hit me. You can't really say it washed over me. It's hard to describe. I simply fainted. I remember my body floating in the air. That was probably the blast, but I don't know how far I was blown. When I came to my senses, my surroundings were silent. There was no wind. I saw a slight threadlike light, so I felt I must be alive. I was under stones. I couldn't move my body. I heard voices crying, “Help! Water!” It was then I realized I wasn't the only one. I couldn't really see around me. I tried to say something, but my voice wouldn't come out.

“Fire! Run away! Help! Hurry Up!” They weren't voices but moans of agony and despair. “I have to get help and shout,” I thought. The person who rescued me was Mom, although she herself had been buried under our collapsed house. Mom knew the route I'd been taking. She came, calling out to me. I heard her voice and cried for help. Our surroundings were already starting to burn. Fires burst out from just the light itself. It didn't really drop. It just flashed.

It was beyond my mother's ability. She pleaded, “My daughter's buried here, she's been helping you, working for the military.” She convinced soldiers nearby to help her and they started to dig me out. The fire was now blazing. “Woman, hurry up, run away from here,” soldiers called. From underneath the stones I heard the crackling of flames. I called to her, “It's all right. Don't worry about me. Run away.” I really didn't mind dying for the sake of the nation. Then they pulled me out by my legs.

Nobody there looked like human beings. Until that moment I thought incendiary bombs had fallen. Everyone was stupefied. Humans had lost the ability to speak. People couldn't scream, “It hurts!” even when they were on fire. People didn't say, “It's hot!” They just sat catching fire.

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My clothes were burnt and so was my skin. I was in rags. I had braided my hair, but now it was like a lion's mane. There were people, barely breathing, trying to push their intestines back in. People with their legs wrenched off. Without heads. Or with faces burned and swollen out of shape. The scene I saw was a living hell."

The blast killed between 70,000 and 80,000 people immediately, but by November the count was up to 130,000. People who were far enough from ground zero to survive suffered from burns and radiation. Unlike previous aerial attacks, the damage at Hiroshima was long-term and caused by only one bomb.

The American military wanted "to reinforce the shock value of the bomb." [12] News traveled slowly from the destroyed city, so the military printed 6 million leaflets to inform other Japanese about what had happened to Hiroshima, to encourage them to ask leaders for peace, and to evacuate cities to avoid further attack.

Only three days passed before the US military dropped a second atomic bomb. A plane called Bock's Car, piloted by Maj. Charles S. Sweeney, dropped the "Fat Man" plutonium bomb on Nagasaki on August 9. The primary target had been Kokura, but bad weather caused the plane to head for the secondary target. The densely populated port city had about 270,000 inhabitants. Between 60,000-70,000 people died in the three months after the bombing. The leaflets calling for people to leave were not dropped until the day after the second bombing. [13]


The Japanese government had been slow to react to Hiroshima's destruction. But the second nuclear attack against Nagasaki and the declaration of war by the Soviet Union on August 8 convinced Emperor Hirohito that it was finally time to come to terms with defeat. On August 10 Japan offered to accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, as long as the emperor would remain. Some of Truman's advisors recognized that the transition to peace would be much smoother if the emperor stayed in power, at least as a figurehead. In effect, the Americans ended up declaring they had received an "unconditional surrender" from Japan even as they accepted the condition of keeping Hirohito in office.

At the end of the war, 3 million Japanese people had died and the rest of the population was near starvation. Japan's industrial capacity was at ten percent of the prewar level. Japan lost the war and all the colonies it had acquired. The US military occupied the nation until 1952.

Reconsidering Atomic Weapons

At first, American public opinion was very much in favor of the use of atomic weapons. But as more information about civilian suffering, such as John Hersey's profile of six victims of Hiroshima, made its way into the news, support wavered. Some wondered if using nuclear bombs had been necessary given the losses already inflicted by air raids, blockades, and the entry of the Soviet Union. James B. Conant, who had played a leading role in developing nuclear

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technology and served on the Interim Committee and as president of Harvard University, believed that using the bomb would help secure peace in the future. The damage from such weapons was so awesome it would, he said, “awaken the world to abolishing war altogether.”[14] Conant asked Sec. Stimson to explain to the public why the bomb was necessary. His article, ghost-written by his junior aid McGeorge Bundy, provided a defense of America’s decision to use atomic weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki as the “least abhorrent choice.” He went further, saying the bombs were necessary to avoid a ground invasion of Japan which might have been “expected to cost over a million casualties to American forces alone.”[15]

Even though the article provided no supports for such a statement, the figure of one million (or sometimes, half a million) seeped into the American consciousness, supplemented by comment made by Truman and other leaders in the postwar years. Historians have looked closely at government records and found no evidence that anyone ever presented such a number to the president. When he had expressed concern over casualties, especially at the June 18, 1945 meeting, nothing approaching such a number was discussed. He and his advisors had not engaged in debate over whether to use atomic weapons and did not discuss balancing the cost of invasion against the cost of the bombs.


Historians began re-examining the decision to use the bomb over the next decades. Gal Aperovitz, for example, argued the bomb was not necessary to end the war and was used to achieve political more than military goals.[16] Such an assertion provoked widespread debate. Other scholars, especially Barton J. Bernstein and Martin J. Sherwin, contended that the Truman administration’s motives were primarily military (to end the war), although it had strong diplomatic reasons for showcasing the new technology (cowing the USSR). As time passed, the declassification of documents (especially personal papers of those involved) opened more avenues for research.

In 1981, Paul Fussell, a World War II veteran and professor of Literature, published a provocative defense of the attack on Hiroshima. He claimed a mantle of authority based not on research and historical analysis but on the fact that he had been stationed in the Pacific at the time. The bomb had saved his life, and he objected to those with second-hand knowledge questioning the decision. His piece was countered by Michael Walzer, a well-known philosopher and proponent of Just War Theory, who doubled-down on the heated rhetoric by likening Fussell’s views to those of terrorists who destroy innocent life unnecessarily.

As the fiftieth anniversary of the war’s end approached, most historians specializing in the era agreed on some major points. Walker summarizes them as follows:[17]

- “Truman and his advisers were well aware of alternatives to the bomb that seemed likely, but not certain to end the war within a relatively short time.”

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- “[A]n invasion of Japan would probably not have been necessary to achieve victory.”
- “[T]he postwar claims that the bomb prevented hundreds of thousands of American combat deaths could not be sustained with the available evidence.”
- “[P]olitical considerations figured in the deliberations about the implications of the bomb and the end of the war with Japan.”
- The “primary motivation” of Truman and his advisers was “to end the war at the earliest possible moment—that is, for military reasons.”

They “rejected the traditional view that the bomb was the only alternative to an invasion of Japan,” knowing that firebombing, naval blockade, diplomacy, and the entrance of the Soviets also played key roles in getting Japan to the negotiating table. But this consensus was forged among scholars, at conferences, and through specialized books and articles. The wider public was unaware the change in focus from the mythical calculus that the bombing “saved a million lives” which would have been lost through an invasion of mainland Japan. The refurbishing of the Enola Gay forced a reckoning over how to discuss Hiroshima and the complicated experience of World War II.

Further Reading

Gal Alperovitz, *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth* (Knopf, 1995).

Barton J. Bernstein, “A Postwar Myth: 500,000 US Lives Saved,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 42 (June/July 1968): 38-40.

Michael Bess, *Choices under Fire: Moral Dimensions of World War II* (Vintage Books, 2006).

Martin J. Sherwin, *A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and its Legacies*, 3rd ed. (Stanford University Press, 2003).


Samuel J. Walker, *Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan* (UNC Press, 2004).

[1] Carl Ipsen, *Dictating Demography: The Problem of Population in Fascist Italy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 145.

[2] For more on the Battle of Britain, see Samuel Hynes, *The Soldiers’ Tale*, 124-128.

[3] For more details, see *The Fallen of World War II* (fallen.io), an excellent account of the casualties of the war.

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[4] Michael Bess, *Choices under Fire: Moral Dimensions of World War II* (NY: Vintage Books, 2006), 45.

[5] Ito Hirobumi, "The Status of Civilized Nations," 1899 reprinted in Perry M. Rogers, ed., *Aspects of World Civilization, Vol II* (Prentice Hall, 2003), 179.

[6] Bess, 48.

[7] Samuel J. Walker, *Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan* (UNC Press, 2004), 56.

[8] See Truman's Potsdam Diary Entry, July 15, 1945.

[9] See Truman's Diary July 1945.

[10] Walker, 60-61.

[11] Copilot Robert Lewis quoted in Walker, 76.

[12] Walker, 78.

[13] Walker, 80.

[14] Walker, 101. To hear Bundy's recollection, see *ABC News: Peter Jennings, Hiroshima: Why the Bomb was Dropped*, 1995, <https://youtu.be/9-WnLNLe3sk>

[15] Walker, 102.

[16] Gal Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy* (1965).

[17] Walker, 105-106.